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or criminal action. The committee may also be allowed to review codes of
ethics prepared by state agency heads, recommending changes or improve-
ments as well as recommending legislation to the general assembly relating
to ethics. All or some of these authorizations can be entrusted to a com-
mittee on ethics depending upon how much responsibility the various legis-
latures choose to delegate.
CONCLUSION
High ethical standards stem primarily from individual conscience, and
resolution of ethical problems must rest basically within the individual
himself. Nevertheless, legislation can define ethical standards and hope-
fully set out guidelines which will aid the legislator to know the limits he is
expected to operate within. They can serve as a reminder to him as to the
areas of real or apparent impurity. The conflict of interest provision should
be precise and clear, and at the same time avoid rigid application in an at-
tempt to cover every possible kind of situation. We must be careful not to
make it more difficult to attract the competent and virtuous into public
service.
The acclivity of the quality of men into public office offers perhaps the
best hope for the answer to the problem of honesty in government. The
evils and influences that attend conflicts of interest can never be complete-
ly eradicated, and are not going to dissolve by legislation alone. 52 Those
officials that are determined to wrongfully take advantage of their private
interests through their position in government are not going to repent be-
cause of the passage of conflict of interest legislation. However, hopefully
this legislation might to some degree have an inhibitory result.
Gary Topper
51 Report by the ILLINOIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS COMMISSION on statements
given by New York Senator Whitney North Seymour, Jr., given before the New York
Investigative Committee. Senator Seymour stated that he could not be in the legislature
and not be a member of his law firm as it would be too great of a financial sacrifice.
.52 Davis, supra note 14, at 83: "You cannot get a man to substitute for the totality of
his private and professional past, a public attitude. Not, at least, by making a law. It's
futile to seek a public life for a man without conflicts of interest. Modern psychiatric
knowledge and common sense tells us he does not exist ......
CONSUMER CREDIT-PROPOSED TRUTH-
IN-LENDING LEGISLATION
During the past fifty years consumer credit has had a profound and last-
ing influence on many aspects of economic activity within the United
States. Consumer installment financing, which began before World War I
and rapidly developed during the 1920's, played an important part in the
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development and maintenance of a wide market for consumer durable
goods. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency to use con-
sumer credit for purchases of non-durable goods and services. At the end
of 1919 total consumer credit was 2.6 billion dollars. By 1946 this sum had
grown to 8.3 billion dollars. From 1946 to 1950 total consumer installment
credit reached 21 billion dollars. This growth continued until consumer
credit had reached a total level of 34 billion dollars at the end of 1954.
From 1954 until 1963 total consumer credit increased twofold, to 69.6
billion dollars.' This tremendous growth of consumer credit has not yet
abated. Consumers across the country are not only flocking to stores, but
often are purchasing the more expensive items.2 Furthermore, loan costs do
not stop the consumer.3 For example, during the month of June, 1966, loan
costs increased without any appreciable letup in demand for consumer
credit.4 The only effect of such increase in loan costs was greater selectiv-
ity of customers on the part of lenders. Also, acceptance of credit cards by
commercial banks promises to engender tremendous new pressure for fu-
ture debt accumulation.' Thus, the growth of consumer credit spirals.
This fantastic growth of consumer credit has attributed substantially to
economic and social problems. These problems center upon the fact that
the average consumer does not know the effective cost of consumer credit.
In 1961, former Senator Paul H. Douglas emphasized this when he stated:
Various devices are used to conceal from the consumer just what he is re-
quired to pay. Department stores ordinarily provide credit at the rate of 11/2
per cent per month, which works out at about 18 per cent per year. The
financing of an automobile will cost the consumer at least 12 per cent. Often
it is very much more. But he ordinarily thinks he is getting credit at an in-
terest rate of 5 or 6 per cent. Small loan companies, with stated charges of
2 to 3 per cent per month, are actually receiving from 24 to 36 per cent.
The "add on" or "discount" method used by commercial banks makes the
effective rate of interest nearly double that which the consumer or borrower
thinks he is paying.6
The effect of such non-disclosure is human tragedy at its lowest form.
After discussing the case of William Rodriguez, a family man who had
committed suicide due to pressure from creditors, Mr. Hillel Black in his
account of consumer credit practices said: "The tragedy of the Rodriguez
family is unusual but not unique. Arthur K. Young, director of the Legal
Aid Bureau of United Charities, told the Douglas Committee he knew of a
1 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, SUPPLEMENT TO BANKING AND MON-
ETARY STATISTICS, § 16 (new) CONSUMER CREDIT, 32 (Sept. 1963).
2 See Shopper's Spree Goes on Unabated, Business Week, Sept. 3, 1966, p. 32.
8 Loan Costs Don't Stop the Consumer, Business Week, June 25, 1966, p. 32.
4 Ibid. 5 35 The Reporter 14, Dec. 15, 1966.
6 BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER xiii (William Morrow ed. 1961).
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second debtor's suicide and possibly a third in Chicago since 1957. Not
uncommon, however, are the depredations practiced by the credit gouger.
Their victims almost invariably are people with low incomes, usually un-.
sophisticated, and frequently those whose need for credit is greatest."'7 This
clearly demonstrates the need for consumer protection in the field of con-
sumer credit.
Protection can take two possible forms. One is through self regulation
by the consumer credit industry itself; 8 the other is legislative controls.
The increased growth of consumer credit, unaccompanied by any protec-
tive devices on the part of the industry reinforces the need for legislatures
to enact more stringent consumer protection laws.9 Therefore, it is the
purpose and objective of this paper to review consumer credit legislation
in general and installment loan disclosure statutes in particular.
CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS IN GENERAL
All laws protecting borrowers from unscrupulous lenders are ultimately
derived from the Bible. "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother;
usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon
usury."' 10 "Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him
thy victuals for increase."" These usury prohibitions in the Bible led the
English in 1494 to enact a usury statute, prohibiting the taking of any in-
terest upon a loan of money. 12 In 1545 increased commercial trade impelled
Parliament to enact a usury statute allowing both merchants and lenders to
charge up to 10 per cent interest on credit sales and loans13 thus abrogating
the total prohibition of interest charges that had existed since 1494. But the
English landmark case of Beete v. Bidgood,14 limited the English usury stat-
ute solely to loans of money, .thereby removing installment sale debtors, as
distinguished from direct loan debtors, from the protection of the law. In
Hogg v. Ruffner, 5 the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine
of Beete v. Bidgood in holding that an Indiana usury statute did not apply
to an installment sales contract. The court's theory was that such a con-
tract had none of the characteristics of usury; it was not for the loan of
money or the forbearance of a debt, but rather, it was the current selling
price of goods to be paid for at a later date, as distinguished from a current
cash sale.
7 Supra note 6, at 126.
8 See Hopkins, New Battleground-Consumer Interest, Harvard Business Review,
Sept.-Oct. 1964, p. 97.
9 See generally, supra note 8. 11 LEVITICUS 25: 35-37.
10 DEUTERONOMY 23: 19, 20. 12 11 Hen. 7, c. 8 (1495).
13a37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545). See generally 2 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 148 (1935).
14 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K-B 1827). 1;66 U.S. 115 (1864).
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As a result of Hogg v. Ruffter,"' many states have enacted Installment
Sales Statutes for the protection of the consumer who purchases on a time-
credit plan. These laws are commonly referred to as control acts or dis-
closure statutes. Their provisions control the installment sales transaction
by requiring the installment seller to list and disclose in minute detail the
essentials constituting the sale.17 These installment sales statutes have ade-
quately protected the consumer in installment sales transactions, but have
failed to reach debtors in a direct loan situation."' Consequently, the area
of consumer loans was without adequate legislative protection except for
the state's usury statute which often times set only maximum and mini-
mum rates a lender could charge per loan. To rectify this dilemma, many
states have enacted installment loan statutes or have amended their usury
and interest statutes to include various consumer protective devices in a
direct loan of money.' 9
TRUTH IN LENDING
Installment loan laws generally allow a lender to receive a rate of inter-
est greater than the legal or contract rate either directly by prescribing a
higher rate of interest, or indirectly by allowing the lender to add the in-
terest charges to or deduct it in advance from the legal or contract interest
rates. Approximately four-fifths of the states have enacted special install-
ment loan laws. The defect, however, with the bulk of such legislation is
that it does not contain mandatory full disclosure provisions that enable
the consumer-borrower to determine his true or actual annual rate of in-
terest in terms he can readily understand. These full disclosure provisions
are commonly referred to as truth in lending. Only thirteen states having
installment loan statutes have any truth in lending provisions either within
the installment loan statute itself or in an interest or usury statute. Truth in
lending provisions can be classified into four types based upon their dis-
closure provisions.
Two states have enacted installment loan statutes with a disclosure pro-
16 Ibid.
17 See generally Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales,
68 YALE L. J. 839 (1959); Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation,
44 CORNELL L. Q. 38 (1958); Comment, Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinter-
pretation of General Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 303
(1960).
18 Wernick v. National Bond and Inv. Co., 276 Ill. App. 84 (1934).
19 CoL. REV. STAT. § 73-2-5 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 36, § 97 (1961); Hawaii
Laws 1963, Act. No. 139; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, § 24(a) (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 19-13-
106 (1951); Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 287, S 215 (1962); MAss. ACTS ch. 587, §§ 1-4 (1966);
MINN. STAT. ch. 48.157 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17.9A-59-36 (Cum. Supp. 1966); PENN.
BANKING CODE, § 309, P.L. No. 356, (1966); S.C. CODE § 8-800.11 (1966); S.D. CODE
§ 6.04A06 (1960); WIsC. STAT. ANN. ch. 115, § 05(4) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
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vision that requires notes evidencing a loan to contain the statement that
the loan was made pursuant to the Installment Loan Act.20 These disclosure
provisions, without more, leaves the consumer uninformed as to his specific
undertaking, thus falling far short of the disclosure objective in effectual
truth in lending legislation.
Other states' disclosure statutes21 require the lender to furnish the bor-
rower with a written statement of all the charges made by the lender on
the loan. These statutes are designed to inform the borrower of the amount
of his loan and the service charges made in connection with the loan. The
disclosure statute adopted by South Carolina2 2 represents one of the more
effective disclosure provisions in this classification. It provides that the
lender disclose to the borrower, at the time the loan is made, the original
principal amount of the loan, a description of the payment schedule and
various other features of the loan relating to prepayment and security.
This provision, however, fails to provide the consumer with a principal to
interest rate that he can use to determine the true annual cost of the loan
in terms whereby he can compare costs of other loans he may have the
option to undertake.
In an attempt to meet the full disclosure problem, a small minority of the
states have enacted truth in lending provisions23 that express the interest
charges as a simple annual rate. The Wisconsin Money and Rates of Inter-
est Act,24 which is representative of such legislation, provides that the
20IND. ANN. STAT. 19-13-106 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-59.36 (Cur. Supp.
1966).
2 1 COL. REV. STAT. 9 13-2-5 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 36, § 97 (1961); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 74, § 24(a) (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 287, § 215 (1962); MINN. STAT. ch.
48.157 (1965); S.C. CODE § 8-800.11 (1966); S.D. CODE § 6.04A06 (1960); PENN. BANKING
CODE, § 309, P. L. No. 356, (1966). Pennsylvania limits their disclosure provision to
revolving credit plans. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 31 (1961).
22 S.C. CODE § 6.04A06 (1960): "(a) The licensee shall disclose, at the time a loan is
made, the following to the obligor on a loan transacted pursuant to this chapter, (if
there are two or more obligors on the loan contract, delivery to one of them shall be
sufficient) in a written statement in conspicuous type: (1) The amount and date of the
note or loan contract and of its maturity; (2) the original principal amount of the loan
excluding any charge made under 88-100.10; (3) the original dollar charge for the loan;
(4) a description of the payment schedule; (5) the right of the obligor to repay the loan
in full prior to maturity, and the fact that such prepayment in full will reduce the
charge for the loan; (6) the nature of the security, if any; (7) every deduction from
the loan or payment made by the obligor through the licensee for insurance, and a
description of the insurance coverage for which each deduction or payment was made;
(8) the name and address of the obligor and of the licensee; (9) signature of principal
borrower directly beneath amount of cash borrower actually received . Compare
COL. REV. STAT. § 73-2-5 (1963).
23 HAWAII LAWS, Act No. 139, 1963; MAss. AcTs ch. 587, §§ 1-4 (1966); Wise. STAT.
ANN. ch. 115, § 05(4) (Cum. Supp. 1963).
24 WIsC. STAT. ANN. ch. 115, § 05(4) (Cum. Supp. 1963): "(4) Any person making a
loan for which interest is agreed to be paid at a rate exceeding ... of $10 upon $100
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lender deliver to the borrower a statement of the terms of the loan, includ-
ing the rate of interest expressed in terms of simple interest and prepay-
ment privileges, if any. This type of statute enables the sophisticated bor-
rower to compare the costs of various loans available. But the average con-
sumer who borrows money still has difficulty in understanding how to
compare one interest rate against another. Thus, this type of statute fails to
reach the debtor whose need for full disclosure is the greatest.
In order to apprize the unsophisticated borrower of the cost of his loan
in terms he can understand, some states have enacted disclosure provisions
requiring the lender to express the actual or maximum rate used in com-
puting charges as dollars per one hundred dollars per month per annum.
21
This expression of interest rates in terms of dollars enables the average con-
sumer to see in the simplest possible terms the cost of his loan, thereby
giving him a basis to compare the costs of other loans which may be avail-
able to him. The New York Banking Laws 20 require that each borrower
receive evidence of the loan stating the charges as a rate in dollars per one
hundred dollars principal amount of loan. Although this provision ade-
quately informs the bank borrower of the true cost of his loan, in terms he
can understand, it nevertheless fails in two respects. First, the statute ap-
plies solely to consumer loans made by a commercial bank and thereby ex-
cludes all other types of financial institutions. A consumer undertaking a
loan at a finance company would not fall under this provision. Second,
this New York statute does not require detailed disclosure to the borrower
of the nature of his loan. The Nebraska Interest Laws 27 are quite similar to
the New York Banking Laws in that they both require interest on loans to
be expressed as dollars per one hundred dollars per year. Nebraska's law
for one year computed upon the declining principal of the loan shall, at or prior to
making such loan, deliver to the borrower a statement, which may be incorporated in
a copy of the evidence of indebtedness, setting forth all of the terms of the transaction
in clear and distinct language, including: (a) the rate of interest agreed upon in terms
either of simple interest computed on the declining principal balance or of the actual
interest cost in money, (b) a statement that the loan may be prepaid in full or in part
and that, if the loan is prepaid in full, the borrower may receive a refund of interest
charged."
25 KAN. STAT. ANN. 16-202 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-501-45-502
(Cum. Supp. 1965); N.Y. BANKINC LAW, § 108-4d (1965).
26 N.Y. BANKINc LAW § 108-4d (1965): "In each application for a loan under this
division and in each note, instrument or other evidence of debt given by a borrower to
evidence such a loan, the rate of charge (stating any minimum as permitted by this
subdivision form), shall be expressed: (i) as a rate in dollars per annum discount per
one hundred dollars face amount of loan, or (ii) as a rate not exceeding six dollars per
annum discount per one hundred dollars face amount of loan; provided, however, that
if the loan has a maturity exceeding thirty-seven months, at a rate not exceeding five
dollars per annum discount per one hundred dollars face amount of loan."
2 7 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-501-45-502 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
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further provides that "if any other charges are exacted of the debtor in
such a contract, such items shall he so itemized as to clearly show the na-
ture thereof.' 2 s Another provision in the Nebraska act is that a penalty is
imposed upon the violation of the act.29 This statute also differs from most
other Interest and Loan statutes in that it applies to both loans and sales
thereby covering all aspects of consumer credit.
The Kansas statute represents the most comprehensive and all inclusive
truth in lending legislation thus far enacted. It provides:
Borrower to receive a copy of contract, or statement of contents. At the time
the loan is made under the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, there will be
delivered to the borrower, or if there be two (2) or more borrowers, to one
(1) of them a copy of the loan in the English language showing in clear and
distinct terms:
(1) the name and address of the lender and of one of the borrowers or a
maker of the loan;
(2) the date of the loan contract;
(3) the schedule of installments or description thereof;
(4) the principal amount of the loan excluding changes;
(5) the rate of charges expressed in dollars per one hundred dollars per year
and the dollar amount of charges as the contract may provide;
(6) the amount collected or paid out for each kind of insurance, if any;
(7) the amount collected or paid out for filing and other fees or charges made
or assessed, and added to the indebtedness to be paid by the borrower, re-
gardless whether they shall be retained by the lender or paid to another,
if said fees or charges arise out of and in connection with the loan;
(8) a general description of the collateral or security for the loan including all
other accommodation or other joint makers (co-makers);
(9) that the borrower may prepay the loan in whole or in part at any time
during the lender's regular business hours, and in the case the charges
have been added to the principal of the loan that such charges are subject
to the refund requirements in subsection (b)(2) herein, if such loan is
prepaid in full.30
This statute fully informs the borrower as to the cost of his loan and the
detailed nature of his undertaking. This is as specific as any honest busi-
nessman should be required to be in disclosure to a borrower.
28Supra note 27.
29 NEB. REv. STAT. § 45-502 (Curn. Supp. 1965): "Contract of loan or sale; charges;
violation; penalty. If any contract of loan or sale shall be entered into in violation of
section 45-501, or if the rate actually used in computing charges exceeds the rate stated
in the contract, the lender shall have no right to collect or receive any interest or
charges on such contract. If any interest or other charges have been collected, the lender
shall forfeit to the debtor all interest and other charges collected on the contract. There
shall also be allowed to the debtor such reasonable attorney's fee as the court shall deter-
mine for services rendered in obtaining a judicial determination of the fact of any such
violation." Supra note 27.
'
0KAN. STATE A,,N. § 16-202(c) (Cur. Supp. 1965) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent, that the only states with
adequate truth in lending legislation are Kansas31 and Nebraska. 32 Presently
many of the states have truth in lending bills pending in their legislatures;3 3
the likelihood of these bills becoming law in the near future seems doubt-
ful.
Because of the state's failure to enact their own truth-in-lending legisla-
tion, there have been a number of attempts to enact such legislation at the
federal level.84 In 1963 former Senator Paul H. Douglas stated five reasons
why a truth in lending statute was necessary. First, protecting the con-
sumer; second, protecting the businessman; third; invigorating competi-
tion; fourth, stabilizing the economy; and fifth, encouraging economic
growth.3 5
In the present 90th Congress there is a Senate bill pending the purpose
of which is to promote "the informed use of credit to the benefit of the
national economy. 3' This bill would apply to both direct loans and install-
ment credit sales. The bill provides for full disclosure in great detail by
requiring the creditor to state all charges and to express such costs in terms
of an annual percentage rate. It further provides that the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System shall regulate the disclosure of credit
costs. In addition, the bill imposes a civil penalty of $100, or in an amount
equal to twice the finance charge required, whichever is greater, but not
to exceed $2000 in any credit transaction.3 7 It should be noted that al-
though this federal proposal covers the complete gamut of truth in lending
legislation, it nevertheless fails to require credit costs to be expressed in
terms of dollars per one hundred dollars. Consequently, the unsophisticated
borrower would not benefit from its passage.
Only truth in lending statutes with full disclosure provisions will allevi-
ate the economic and social problems arising from the great increase in
consumer credit. This form of legislation is mandatory to enable the un-
sophisticated consumer to determine the actual cost of any loans he may
undertake. As a guide to both Congress and state legislatures, the compre-
hensive Kansas disclosure legislation3 8 should be considered as a model
truth-in-lending statute.
Errol Halperin
1 Supra note 27. 32 Supra note 30.
33 For example the bill now pending in the Illinois General Assembly, S.B. 30, 75th
General Assembly (1967), which is comparable to the Kansas statute, supra note 30.
34 See generally note 5 supra. See also Kelly, Expert Views Credit Bill, Nation's Busi-
ness, June, 1965, p. 104.
35 Speech of Hon. Paul H. Douglas of Ill. in the U.S. Senate, Thursday, Feb. 7, 1963.
386 S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 87 Supra note 36. 38 Supra note 30.
